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I. Introduction
It was in the late 1970s when Henry Mintzberg first proposed that any 
organization’s strategy is made up of the intended and the emergent. Though few 
empirical examinations of his work have been performed, his theories have been 
generally accepted by academics and practitioners alike. This study builds on 
the few empirical studies that have conducted by investigating the link between 
intended strategy and firm performance. In doing so, this study will look at 
order-of-entry strategies.
II. Theoretical Perspective
It has been over three decades since Henry Mintzberg (1978) first argued 
that organizational strategy can be the result of both the intended and the 
emergent. His ground-breaking work spawned a number of other models that 
further examined the strategy formulation process (e.g. Bourgeois & Brodwin, 
1984; Nonaka, 1988; Hart, 1992). Though critics exists (e.g. Ansoff, 1991) 
his concepts have generally been well-received among both academics and 
practitioners. As such, it is surprising that there have been relatively few 
empirical investigations of his model.
In one recent study of electrical utilities, Froelich and McLagan (2008) 
found empirical evidence to support Mintzberg’s argument that not all intended 
strategies are realized. And two studies, Golden (1992) and Liedtka and 
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Rosenblum (1996) showed that the corporate-SBU relationships and strategic 
conversations respectively are two of several possible factors that may facilitate 
or inhibit the implementation of an organization’s intended strategy.  But 
of greater importance to this study, Kald (2003) examined the Nordic paper 
and pulp industry and found that there is substantial congruence between an 
organization’s intended strategy and its realized strategy. If that is the norm in 
other industries, then one can reasonably conclude that a firm’s intended strategy 
has a real impact on an organization, including its performance. 
This study argues that intended strategies have an impact on company 
performance because of its influence on decisions made. Support for such a 
claim comes from research done at both the individual and organizational level. 
For example, Ajzen (1991) argued that intentions shape people’s behavior, 
including the decisions that people make. In fact, evidence suggests that 
intentions are a better predictor of behavior than traits and attitudes (Krueger, 
et al., 2000). Similarly, scholars have argued that intention plays a significant 
role in business behavior, such as the decision to become an entrepreneur (cf. 
Gelderen et al., 2008).
At the organizational level of analysis, Mintzberg argued that there was a 
direct connection between intended strategy and the decisions made within an 
organization, “we need a clearly defined intended strategy to do our job – to 
buy our machines, hire our workers, standardize our procedures (1978, p. 123).” 
And evidence for such a connection comes from Mintzberg’s own studies (1978, 
1985) and from several relatively recent studies, where researchers have found 
that growth in new ventures is in part dependent on the entrepreneurs’ intentions 
to grow their organization (cf. Dutta & Thorngill, 2008). 
While intended strategy should not be confused with the related concept 
of strategic intent (which is more like vision), research in that area is relevant. 
Hamel and Prahalad (1989) defined strategic intent as the planned direction to 
be pursued by the company. In other words, strategic intent can be seen as a 
company’s passionate core (Bate, 2010) informing and shaping organizational 
decisions (Landrum, 2008).  Going further, it is argued that through its influence 
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on decisions made, strategic intent has a significant impact on firm performance 
(Kopel & Loffler, 2008). For example, in a study of 354 small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) in the UK, researchers found that strategic intent 
directly influenced investment decisions, which in turn was link to firm growth 
(Morash, 2001). And in a case study of a medical technology company, Ice (2007) 
maintains that strategic intent played a central role in that firm’s performance. 
Finally, in a direct test of Mintzberg’s model, Anderson and Nielsen 
(2009) found that among a sample of 180 firms there is a complementary link 
between intended and emergent strategies and firm performance. Therefore, 
while acknowledging that not all intentions are realized, it is quite probable that 
intended strategies have a significant impact on firm performance.
1. Using ‘Order-of-Entry’ to Test the Relationship Between Intended 
Strategy and Performance
For more than a half century, researchers have investigated the performance 
implications of ‘order of entry’ (Frawley & Fahy, 2006). Most work has focused 
on the concept of first-mover advantage as applied to ‘first-to-market’ contexts 
(Patterson, 1993), with early studies seemingly confirming that first movers 
enjoy a lasting competitive advantage over later entrants (Frawley & Fahy, 
2006). However, in their review of the literature, Frawley and Fahy (2006) 
pointed out that other studies have found evidence that contradicted the existence 
of first-mover advantages, or provided evidence of first-mover disadvantages or 
later-mover advantages. For example, Oliver (1999) argues that for economic 
and political reasons, it is becoming very difficult to create or maintain so-
called first-mover advantages. Therefore, despite several decades of scrutiny, 
the link between order of entry and firm performance remains inconclusive or 
contradictory so further examinations seem warranted (Frawley & Fahey, 2006). 
Prior work on order of entry generally focused on business units’ entry into 
specific product markets (Patterson, 1993). However, if we follow more recent 
yet similar concepts, such as competitive churning (El Kahal, 2001), that speak 
to the strategic actions of a company as a whole, it might be possible to reshape 
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order-of-entry research while testing the impact of intended strategies on firm 
performance.  
For example, though a company may have the intended strategy of being 
the first-mover in all of the markets in which it competes, we have already 
established that there is good reason to believe that their intended strategy is 
not always realized (Mintzberg, 1985). However, even if an intended strategy is 
not always realized, such as trying to be first to a specific market; that may not 
necessarily mean that their intended strategy is flawed.  For instance, in the later 
part of the 20th century, one of GE’s intended strategies was a directive from 
then CEO Jack Welch that all business units had to be #1 or #2 in their industry 
or market; or had a reasonable probability of becoming #1 or #2. Although that 
strategy was at least partially credited for GE success under Welch (Braukman, 
2010), one cannot assume that GE managers always made the correct decision 
as to which business units to keep, buy or sell. In short, given that prior order-of-
entry studies focused on individual events, it is possible that the inconsistencies 
in past empirical studies may simple be the observable artifacts of a bigger 
picture.
2. Pioneers, Leapfroggers & Low Cost Imitators
Following other order-of-entry research (cf. A.A. Thompson, A.J. 
Strickland & J.E. Gamble, 2010), this study grouped companies into three 
categories. However, unlike most order-of-entry work, this study will examine 
relationships at the company level rather than specific markets. Therefore, terms 
such as first-mover or later entrant do not seem robust enough to capture the 
true nature of company’s intended strategy. Therefore, it was necessary to use 
a different set of terms that better reflect the larger lens through which we are 
re-examining entry issues. More specifically, firms will be classified as being: 
pioneers, leapfroggers, or low cost imitators.
One criticism of past research on order-of-entry was the use of self-
reporting to build a dataset. The problem wasn’t necessarily due to a weaknesses 
inherent in the process, but that fact that databases built from the process 
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often had several firms who identified themselves as a first-mover (Frawley & 
Fahy, 2006). Even in some of the studies that utilized the PIMS dataset, more 
than half of the businesses were classified as first-movers (Buzzell & Gates, 
1987). Unfortunately, by definition there should be only one first-mover for 
each market. This led critics to conclude that these datasets were only capable 
of determining early-mover advantage as opposed to first-mover advantage 
(Frawley & Fahy, 2006). Fortunately, such criticism can be largely mooted by 
defining pioneers as any company whose intended strategy is to be the first-
mover in the industry or industries in which it competes, even if they don’t 
always succeed in being the first-mover in each specific market. This is because 
having multiple pioneers per industry is not only acceptable it is probably 
expected.
Researchers have argued that some innovative firms can gain an advantage 
by purposely entering after learning from pioneers’ successes and mistakes 
(Golder & Tellis, 1993). In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests that pioneers can 
frequently get overtaken by other innovative firms (Kopel & Loffler, 2008) 
whose intended strategy is to let others spend the resources needed to develop 
a market and entering later with a more innovative product (El Kahal, 2001). In 
this study, these types of companies will be called Leapfroggers. 
Finally, in past studies of order-of-entry, several authors categorized certain 
firms in their sample as ‘imitative competition’ (Bond & Lean, 1977; Frawley 
& Fahy, 2006). At an industry level of analysis, we expect that there will also be 
companies whose intended strategy is to wait passively until the pioneers and 
leapfroggers have blazed a trail; entering markets later with low-cost generic 
products.  These firms can be labeled low-cost imitators. However, due to the 
limitations of our sample (see section III) we could not test any hypotheses 
concerning low-cost imitators. Therefore, from this point forward we will focus 
on pioneers and leapfroggers.
3. Hypotheses
Most order-of-entry work has focused on the concept of first-mover 
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advantage as applied to ‘first-to-market’ contexts (Patterson, 1993). In their 
review of the literature, Frawley and Fahy (2006) pointed out that several studies 
have found evidence that contradicted the existence of first-mover advantages, 
or provided evidence of first-mover disadvantages or later-mover advantages. 
However, many more studies seem to conclude that first movers enjoy a lasting 
competitive advantage over later entrants (Frawley & Fahy, 2006). For example, 
in a longitudinal study of the cigarette industry, Whitten (1979) found that first 
movers received significant and long-term sales advantages. While in study of 
prescription drug markets, Bond and Lean (1977) discovered that the first firm to 
offer and promote a new type of product received a substantial sales advantage. 
Contributors argued that first movers gain a competitive advantage over later 
entrants by acquiring cost advantages (Robinson & Fornell, 1985), barriers to 
entry advantages (Bain, 1956) or economies of scale advantages (Kerin et al., 
1992), among other things. If we assume that these relationships are similar 
when using a higher level perspective, then companies which are pursuing a 
pioneering strategy should perform better than firms that do not.
Therefore, the above arguments lead to the following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 1  Companies whose intended strategy is to pursue a pioneering 
strategy will perform better than those companies whose intended strategy 
is to pursue a leapfrogging strategy.
4. Contingency Perspective
Frawley and Fahy (2006) contend that past research on order-of-entry has 
had the tendency to investigate industries in which advantages to first movers are 
greater. They also suggested that order-of-entry research has over-emphasized 
the simple market entry order effect on firm performance. As such, frameworks 
incorporating a contingency perspective (Miles & Snow, 1998) might provide a 
more complete understanding of the significance of order-of-entry (Frawley & 
Fahy, 2006).  
Given the above comments, investigating the link between intended strategy 
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and performance across different industries would certainly be appropriate. 
Unfortunately, the relatively small sample of firms that participated in this 
study did not make it possible to examine the moderating impact of industry 
characteristics. Instead, we investigated the impact of differing business climates 
on the link between intended strategy and firm performance. In particular, 
the past half-decade or so provides an opportunity to look at the relationship 
between intended strategy and performance in three distinct business climates: a 
bullish business climate, a distressed business climate and a cautious rebound.
III. Methodology
1. Sample
We surveyed a random sample of 305 Japanese manufacturing companies 
listed on either the first or second section of the Tokyo stock exchange.  Out of 
those 305, we received replies from 92 firms, with four firms stating that they 
did not wish to discuss their strategy and 9 firms returning a questionnaire that 
was not usable. This left 79 usable questionnaires, for a response rate of twenty-
six percent. This was thought to be a relatively high response rate, especially 
given Japanese company’s general reluctance to discuss strategic matters to 
outsiders.  We attribute the relatively high response rate to persistence (multiple 
follow-ups), the simple one page format of the questionnaire, and providing 
each company with repeated assurances of anonymity. The responses came 
from a wide range of industries, including: consumer goods, foods, precision 
electronics, consumer electronics and computers.
Out of the 79 firms that provided a useable questionnaire, only two 
identified themselves as low-cost imitators. Therefore, further analysis of low-
cost imitators was not possible. It should be noted that this result was not 
surprising. Our assumption had been that relatively high material and labor costs 
would make it difficult for many Japanese manufacturers to pursue a low-cost 
strategy. 
Finally, we also excluded four companies that identified themselves as 
having changed their intended strategy during the timeframe examined in this 
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study. We did so in the belief that such changes would introduce an additional 
variable that could question the validity of the results. This now left us with 73 
companies.
2. Timeframes
This study examined the relationship between intended strategy and firm 
performance in three distinct time periods. The first time period ran 15 months 
from early January of 2005 to the beginning of April of 2006, when the Nikkei 
stock index rose from 11518 to 17563 or an average gain of 403 points per 
month. We labeled this time period: a bullish business climate. The second time 
period ran 16 months from early July of 2007 to the middle of October 2008, 
when the Nikkei stock index dropped from 18141 to 7649 or an average drop 
of 656 points per month. This time period was labeled: a distressed business 
climate. The third and final time period that we investigated ran 18 months from 
the middle of October 2008 to the middle of March 2010, when the Nikkei stock 
index rose 7649 to 10824 or an average gain of 176 points per month. We named 
this time period: a cautious rebound.
3. Measures
Intended Strategy:  Our one page questionnaire included brief definitions 
for pioneering, leapfrogging and low-cost imitating strategies. We then asked 
each company to pick the definition that best described their company’s intended 
strategy [in terms of order of entry] in January 2005 and as of March, 2010. 
Since there are problems with using a single self-reported description, we had a 
research assistant to look over published company documents, such as letters to 
shareholders, for indications of that company’s intended strategy.  We did this on 
the assumption that a company’s intended strategy could be deduced from such 
documents. That assumption seems to sound as prior studies have shown that 
a company’s strategic intent (a related concept) can be deduced by collecting 
stories about the company either through oral history or the written word (Bate, 
2010). Further, examining letters to shareholders has been found to be fairly 
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useful in determining a companies’ strategy in general (Barry & Elmes, 1997; 
Fiol, 1995; Landrum, 2008) and its intended strategy in particular (Mintzberg, 
1978). Out of the remaining 73 useable questionnaires, we could not reasonably 
confirm the intended strategy of 7 companies. This left us with 66 cases for our 
analysis. Comparing the characteristics of respondents to non-respondents did 
not identify significant differences in organizational size, age or performance. 
Dependent Variable: The various measurements of performance are 
similar in the sense that they are all equally contentious (Lin, et al., 2005). We 
felt that stock prices were the best measure of performance for this study for 
several reasons. First, stock prices possess attributes such as objectivity and 
understandability, which are required of acceptable performance measures 
(Merchant & Bruns, 1986). Further, in a study of 241 firms, Lehn and Makhiva 
(1996) found that stock prices were highly correlated with economic value added 
(EVA) and market value added (MVA), arguing that all three were effective as 
“signals of strategic change and as metrics relevant to strategic development 
(1996).”  Finally, since we wanted to examine the relevance of intended strategy 
across three distinct economic climates, stock prices (being tracked daily) was 
the measure of performance that would align most closely with the time periods 
in question (certainly more so than quarterly accounting-based measures, such 
as ROA).  
The percentage change in stock price over the initial value in each period 
was computed by subtracting  the initial value of each stock (the first day of 
each period) from the ending value of each stock (the last day of each period), 
and then dividing the computed value by the initial value of each stock. This 
would give us a raw figure of each stock’s percentage change for each time 
period. To control for any industry effects we then calculated an industry 
average (percentage change in stock value) for each of the industries represented 
in our sample. We then calculated an adjusted number by simply subtracting the 
industry average performance from each company’s performance figure. 
Controls: Organizational performance is often constrained by a variety 
of factors, such as past performance, organizational age, and size (Hannan & 
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Freeman, 1977). Therefore, three control variables were included in the model: 
past performance (the prior period’s relative change in stock price); age (years 
since founding), and; size (total sales prior to each time period in questioned).
4. Results
As indicated in the top row of table 1, correlation analysis reveals several 
relationships relevant to our hypotheses. First, there is a significant positive 
relationship between being a pioneer and firm performance during a bullish 
business climate. In addition, being a pioneer seems to have a slightly significant 
negative relationship with firm performance during a cautious rebound. 
There were no significant relationships found in the time period we labeled as 
distressed.
Among the control measures, there seems to be no significant relationships 
between age and size with firm performance. And as for prior performance, 
only performance during the distressed period had a significant and negative 
relationship with consequent performance. In other words, those companies that, 
relatively speaking, fell the furthest had a greater difficulty trying to rebound 
from the hole that they had fallen into.
In further tests of the relationship between intended strategy and firm 
performance, we utilized multiple regression analysis to introduce our control 
variables (see Table 2). 
As in the correlation analysis, column 1 indicates that after controlling 
for age, size and past performance, there is a strong relation between intended 
strategy and firm performance. More specifically, it would seem that in a bullish 
business climate, pioneers performed significantly better than leapfroggers. In 
the second column, our results show no significant relationships. In other words, 
in a distressed business climate, and after controlling for size, age and past 
performance; pioneers and leapfroggers were equally adversely affected. Finally, 
in the third column, our results indicate that there is a significant relationship 
between intended strategy and firm performance, after controlling for age, size 
and past performance. In other words, in a cautious rebound, leapfroggers seem 
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to be the better performers.
It should be noted that in the third column both age and size were positively 
and significantly related to firm performance. It would seem that, on average, 
older firms did a better job of recovering from the distressed business climate 
than did newer firms, and larger firms did a better job of recovering than smaller 
firms. One possible explanation for the former is that older firms are more likely 
to have gone through a crisis in their past and ‘organizational learning and 
memory’ would allow them to make better decisions during and immediately 
after the latest crisis (Abecker & Decker, 1999; Dodgson, M. 1993). As for the 
latter, one interpretation is that large firms have more available resources to use 
in the recovery effort. A second interpretation is that larger firms inherently have 
more inertia (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), and this inertia inhibits organizations 
from making quick decisions, including those that are rash and ill-advised.
V. Discussion 
A review of prior literature led us to the hypothesis that companies with 
the intended strategy of pursuing a pioneering strategy will perform better 
than companies with the intended strategy of pursuing a leapfrogging strategy. 
However, our results only partially confirm our hypothesis. It seems that the 
intended strategy – performance link depends greatly on the business climate: 
intended pioneers doing better in bullish climates while intended leapfroggers 
do better in a cautions rebound.
As for the former result, El Kahal (2001) argues that a sustained 
proliferation of new products is the only way to sustain a pioneering strategy. 
In other words, the pioneer must continuously introduce new products in order 
to maintain any advantage that they generate. Therefore, pursuing a pioneer 
strategy seems to be most suited when technological development is rapid; and 
when economic growth and consumer acceptance of new products is just as fast 
(El Kahal, 2001). This is most likely to happen in a bullish business climate 
when people are willing and able to spend money on the latest gadget.
Further, in an economic climate characterized by the rapid pace of 
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technological progress, being a leapfrogger may inhibit competitiveness. This is 
partly because the fast pace of technological change leads leapfroggers to believe 
that they can capture market share by improving earlier versions of a product 
and adding new features. However, leapfroggers can become too reactive to 
what the pioneers are doing. In fact, it is possible that these companies can 
become so pre-occupied with the pioneers’ moves that they can fail to formulate 
and/or execute their own innovations.
As for the latter result, a cautious rebound is often reflective of significant 
changes in consumer behavior. In the United States, for example, in the ‘great 
recession’ consumers have moved from the reckless pursuit of the ‘latest gadget’ 
to significantly more measured purchases based on needs and overall value 
divided by price (Wharton, 2009). This follows observations in other countries 
where a financial crisis has significantly impacted consumer behavior (McKenzie 
& Schargrodsky, 2005; McKenzie, 2006).  Anecdotes from the popular press, 
and the authors’ own observations, suggests that the Japanese consumers have 
also become much more conservative in their purchases
In times of slow consumer demand pursuing a pioneering strategy may 
be counter-productive. Since the market may be slow to accept new products, 
pioneers may be spinning their wheels in vain in trying to come up with 
innovations, as it is possible that many new products will fail to generate 
significant consumer interest.  Once leapfroggers have reverse-engineered the 
product, prices and margins will decrease. Therefore, a pioneering company can 
not gain any advantages, or worse incur disadvantages, by trying to be first to 
market. 
It is plausible to argue that leapfroggers have little in the way of initial 
R&D costs.  The majority of such costs would probably involve the reverse-
engineering process.  While several months or years may be spent by pioneers 
developing a new product for the market, it is possible that leapfroggers spend 
considerably less time getting their product to market.  Less time spent getting 
products to market could mean less money invested as the product is prepared 
for the market.  This savings could be passed along to the consumer. Therefore, 
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leapfroggers could have an immediate cost advantage.  Leapfroggers could also 
attempt to compete on differentiation.  Initial products of the pioneering firms 
may have certain features that consumers do not like.  Leapfroggers might be 
able to capitalize on this fact and produce products that are more suitable to the 
customer. 
VI. Conclusion
It would appear that intended strategy has a real impact on firm 
performance. However, the specific impact it has on firm performance is 
contingent on environmental factors, in the case of this study, the prevailing 
business climate. More specifically, our study found that companies with 
the intended strategy of pursuing a pioneering strategy perform better in 
bullish economies while companies with the intended strategy of pursuing a 
leapfrogging strategy do better in cautious rebounds. 
One issue that this study was not able to test was the impact on firm 
performance for companies that are pursuing a low-cost imitator strategy. A 
much larger study over a longer time span would shed more light on this topic. 
In addition, further testing of these results using samples from multiple countries 
would help answer the external validity of these results. It could be true that the 
results found in this study only apply to Japanese based manufacturers.
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Table 1. Mean, standard deviations, and correlations among all variables
  Mean (StD) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Intended Strategy .05 -.10 -.06 -.01 .37*** -.17 -.22*
2. Age 70 (16.6)  .21* .21*  .01 .14 -.04 .20
3. Size 2004 9.02 (15.5)   .99*** .28** -.11 .01 -.16
4. Size 2008 11.06 (17.9)   .31** -.07 -.01 -.13
5. Perf 2004 .05 (.416)    .02 .13 -.05
6. Bull Perf .89 (1.41)     -.11 -.01
7. Crash Perf .65 (.18)       -.31***
8. Rebound Performance .60 (.42)   
Intended Strategy (1=Pioneers, 0=Leapfroggers)
N=66 for all relationships
Standard deviations in parentheses
***p< 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
Table 2. Performance: Multiple regression analysis change in stock price as 
dependent variable
 I II III
Age .013 .000 .006**
 (.010) (.001) (.003)
Size -.001 -.000 .001*
 (.010) (.001) (.000)
Past performance .196 -.007 -.802***
 (.416) (.018) (.257)
Intended Strategy 1.014*** -.054 -.255**
 (.340) (.051) (.096)
Constant  -.511 -.592 -.138
R square .166  .031 .248
F-value 3.042 .486 5.025
Intended Strategy (1=Pioneers, 0=Leapfroggers)
N = 66
Standard errors in parentheses
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10
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<Summary>
Anthony L. Iaquinto
This paper presents an investigation of the performance implications of 
an organization’s intended strategy among a set of Japanese manufacturers. 
Applying a contingency perspective, this study found that firms whose intended 
strategy was of a Pioneer were significantly related to positive changes in stock 
price in a bullish business climate.  However, in a cautious rebound, firms whose 
intended strategy was of a Leapfrogger were found to be the better performers. 
The implications of these results are also discussed.
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